This book demonstrates what kind of problems, originating in a management accounting setting, may be solved with game theoretic models. Game theory has experienced growing interest and numerous applications in the field of management accounting. The main focus traditionally has been on the field of non-cooperative behaviour, but the area of cooperative game theory has developed rapidly and has received increasing attention. Intensive research, in combination with the changing culture of publishing, has produced a nearly unmanageable number of publications in the areas concerned. Therefore, one main purpose of this volume is providing an intensive analysis of the intersection of these areas. In addition, the book strengthens the relationship between the theory and the practical applications and it illustrates the two-sided relationship between game theory and management accounting: new game theoretic models offer new fields of applications and these applications raise new questions forthe theory.

Part. 1. Setting Incentives for Managers: Incentive Compatibility, Similarity Rule, and Goal Congruence.- 2. Reflections on the Practical Applicability of Strategic Game Theory to Managerial Incentivation.- 3. Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts: Behavioural and Multi-Period Performance Measurement Aspects.- 4. Transfer Prices for Coordination under Decentralized Decision Making.- 5. Managerial Compensation, Investment Decisions, and Truthfully Reporting.- 6. Interorganizational Resource Sharing in Research and Development Alliances.- 7. Differences in Social Preferences: Are They Profitable for the Firm?.- 8.Applications and Potentials of Auction Theory in Management Accounting.- 9. The Use of Auction in Nurse Rostering.- Part 2: CooperativeModels - Models of Fairness and its Applications.- 10. Fair Distribution of Cooperation Gains in Supply Chains - A Justification Program from an Economic Point of View.- 11. The Pre-Kernel as a Fair Division Rule for some Cooperative Game Models.- 12. A Talmudic Approach to Bankruptcy Problems.- 13. Sharing the Costs of Access to a Set of Public Goods.- 14. The SD-prenucleolus for TU-Games: Coalitional Monotonicity and Core Stability.- 15. A Shapley Value for Games with Authorization Structure.- 16. Placing Joint Orders when Holding Costs are Negligible and Shortages are not Allowed.- 17. Corporation Tax Games: An Application of Linear Cost Games to Managerial Cost Accounting.- 18. Characteristics of the ¿ -value and the ¿ -value.- 19. The Usability and Suitability of Allocation Schemes for Corporate Cost Accounting.

David Mueller
is Professor of Management Accounting and Control at Brandenburg University of Technology (BTU) Cottbus-Senftenberg. His research interests are cost accounting, life-cycle costing, real options, and cooperative game theory

Ralf Trost
is Professor of Finance in the Faculty of Economic Sciences and Media at Ilmenau University of Technology and recived his doctorate and his habilitation at the University of Augsburg.