David Mueller is Professor of Management Accounting and Control at Brandenburg University of Technology (BTU) Cottbus-Senftenberg. His research interests are cost accounting, life-cycle costing, real options, and cooperative game theory

Ralf Trost is Professor of Finance in the Faculty of Economic Sciences and Media at Ilmenau University of Technology and recived his doctorate and his habilitation at the University of Augsburg.

Contents

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Non-cooperativeModels: Designing Incentives

1 Jennifer Kunz:

Reflections on the Practical Applicability of Strategic Game Theory

to Managerial Incentivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2 Christian Lukas:

Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts: Behavioural and

Multi-Period PerformanceMeasurement Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3 ClemensLöffler:

Transfer Prices for Coordination under Decentralized Decision

Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4 Hans-Ulrich Küpper, Kai Sandner:

Differences in Social Preferences: Are They Profitable for the Firm?

5 Günter Bamberg, Michael Krapp:

Managerial Compensa

tion, Investment Decisions, and Truthfully

Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Non-cooperativeModels: Revealing the True Preferences

6 Max Patzenhauer:

Applications and Potentials of Auction Theory in Management

Accounting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7 Benno Woskowski:

The Use of Auction in Nurse Rostering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CooperativeModels: Analysing the Notion of Fairness

8 Stephan Zelewski:

Fair Distribution of Cooperation Gains in Supply Chains - A

Justification Program from an Economic Point of View . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9 Holger I. Meinhardt

The Pre-Kernel as a Fair Division Rule for some Cooperative Game

Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10 Juan D. Moreno-Ternero:

A Talmudic Approach to Bankruptcy Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Preface xiii

11 Jens Leth Hougaard:

Sharing the Costs of Access to a Set of Public Goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12 Javier Arin, Ilya Katsev:

The SD-prenucleolus for TU-Games: Coalitional Monotonicity and

Core Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cooperative Models: Applications and Specifications

13 José M. Gallardo, Nieves Jiménez, Andrés Jiménez-Losada:

A Shapley Value for Games with Authorization Structure . . . . . . . . . . .

14 Gerhard Aust, Dora Dominko, Udo Buscher:

Interorganizational Resource Sharing in Research and

Development Alliances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15 Al

ejandro Saavedra-Nieves, Ignacio García-Jurado, M. Gloria

Fiestras-Janeiro:

Placing Joint Orders when Holding Costs are Negligible and

Shortages are not Allowed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16 Ana Meca, J. Carlos Varela-Peña:

Corporation Tax Games: An Application of Linear Cost Games to

Managerial Cost Accounting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17 Stephan Zelewski, Tatjana Heeb:

Characteristics of the t -value and the ¿ -value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18 David Mueller:

The Usability and Validity of Allocation Schemes for Corporate

Cost Accounting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Contributing Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Subject Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Author Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

List of Journal Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  

 

This book demonstrates what kind of problems, originating in a management accounting setting, may be solved with game theoretic models. Game theory has experienced growing interest and numerous applications in the field of management accounting. The main focus traditionally has been on the field of non-cooperative behaviour, but the area of cooperative game theory has developed rapidly and has received increasing attention. Intensive research, in combination with the changing culture of publishing, has produced a nearly unmanageable number of publications in the areas concerned. Therefore, one main purpose of this volume is providing an intensive analysis of the intersection of these areas. In addition, the book strengthens the relationship between the theory and the practical applications and it illustrates the two-sided relationship between game theory and management accounting: new game theoretic models offer new fields of applications and these applications raise new questions for the theory.