The debate between internalism and externalism has become a focal point of attention both in epistemology and in the philosophy of mind and language. Externalism challenges basic traditional internalist conceptions of the nature of knowledge, justification, thought and language. What is at stake, is the very form that theories in epistemology and the philosophy of mind ought to take. This volume is a collection of original contributions of leading internationalauthors reflecting onthe present state of the art concerning the exciting controversies between internalism and externalism.

Richard Schantz ist Professor für Philosophie an der Universität Siegen.

I In Defence of Epistemic Externalism W. P. Alston, The "Challenge" of Externalism; J. Greco, Externalism and Skepticism; Th. Grundmann, Counterexamples to Epistemic Externalism Revisited; H. Kornblith, Conditions on Cognitive Sanity and the Death of Internalism; R. Schantz, Empiricism Externalized; E. Sosa, Circularity and Epistemic Priority II Critiques of Epistemic Externalism J. Cruz and J. Pollock, The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism; R. Feldman, In Search of Internalism and Externalism; R. Fumerton, Inferential Internalism and the Presuppositions of Skeptical Arguments; K. Lehrer and D. A. Truncelitto, Knowledge, Justification and the Cooperative World; B. Stroud, The Epistemological Promise of Externalism; M. Williams, Is Knowledge a Natural Phenomenon? III In Defence of Content Externalism J. Haugeland, Social Cartesianism; R. Garrett Millikan, Existence Proof for a Viable Externalism; K. Sterelny, Externalism, Epistemic Artefacts and the Extended Mind; R. Van Gulick, Outing the Mind - A Teleopragmatic Perspective IVCritiques of Content Externalism J. Heil, Natural Intentionality; T. Horgan, J. Tienson and G. Graham, Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat; F. Jackson, On an Argument from Properties of Words to Broad Content; G. M. A. Segal, Reference, Causal Powers, Externalist Intuitions and Unicorns VAn Exemplary Debate about Content G. Rey, Millikan's (Un?)Compromised Externalism; R. Garrett Millikan, Comments on "Millikan's (Un?)Compromised Externalism" VISelf-Knowledge S. Bernecker, Believing that You Know and Knowing that You Believe; A. Brueckner, McKinsey Redux?; F. Dretske, Knowing what You Think vs Knowing that You think it; P. Jacob, Do we Know how we Know our own Minds yet?; P. Ludlow, What was I Thinking? Social Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Shifting Memory Targets; B. McLaughlin, Anti-Individualism and Minimal Self-Knowledge: A Dissolution of Ebbs's Puzzle VIIThe Epistemic Significance of Perception Ch. Peacocke, Explaining Perceptual Entitlement; J. Van Cleve, Externalism and Disjunctivism VIIIAn Essay on Intentionality C. McGinn, The Objects of Intentionality