Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology--that knowledge is always more valuable than the value of its parts. Using Plato's Meno as a starting point, Kvanvig tackles the different arguments about the value of knowledge and comes to the conclusion that it is less valuable than generally assumed. The book will appeal to students and professional philosophers in epistemology.

Introduction; 1. The value of knowledge is external to it; 2. The value of true belief; 3. The value of justification; 4. Reliabilism, normativity and the special promise of virtue; 5. The Gettier problem and the value of knowledge; 6. Knowledge as irreducibly valuable; 7. Epistemic attitudinalism: semantic and pragmatic approaches; 8. Knowledge and understanding; 9. Conclusion; References; Index.