In the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, Japan underwent two major shifts in political control. In the 1910s, the power of the oligarchy was eclipsed by that of a larger group of professional politicians. In the 1930s, the locus of power shifted again, this time to a set of independent military leaders. In The Politics of Oligarchy, J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances M. Rosenbluth examine a key question of modern Japanese politics: Why were the Meiji oligarchs unable to design institutions capable of protecting their power? Using an analytical framework for oligarchic governments not specific to Japan, the authors ask why the oligarchs chose the political institutions they did, and what consequences those choices engendered for Japan's political competition, economic development, and diplomatic relations. Ramseyer and Rosenbluth argue that understanding these shifts in power may clarify the general dynamics of oligarchic government, as well as theoretical aspects of the relationship between institutional structure and regime change.

List of tables and figure; Series editors' preface; Acknowledgements; 1. Introduction; 2. The collapse of oligarchy: failed attempts at cartel-maintenance; 3. Concession or facade: the Meiji constitution; 4. Electoral rules and party competition: the struggle for political survival; 5. The bureaucracy: who ruled whom?; 6. The courts: who monitored whom?; 7. The military: master of its own fate; 8. Financial politics; 9. Railroad politics; 10. Cotton politics; 11. Conclusion: institutions and political control; Notes; References; Index.