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Legal Orderings and Economic Institutions
von Fabrizio Cafaggi, Antonio Nicita, Ugo Pagano
Verlag: Routledge
Gebundene Ausgabe
ISBN: 978-0-415-32942-2
Erschienen am 01.10.2005
Sprache: Englisch
Format: 239 mm [H] x 167 mm [B] x 26 mm [T]
Gewicht: 680 Gramm
Umfang: 356 Seiten

Preis: 197,50 €
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Inhaltsverzeichnis

This book addresses the lively interaction between the disciplines of law and economics. The contributions encompass some of the core controversial issues in the disciplines arising from interactions between legal orderings and economic institutions.



Fabrizio Cafaggi, Antonio Nicita, Ugo Pagano



Introduction 1. Law, Economics and Institutional Complexity: An Introduction Part 1: Complexity in Law and Economics 2. Economics in the Future of the Law 3. Law and Economics in Historic Perspective 4. Legal Positions and Institutional Complementarities 5. Legislate Today or Wait Until Tomorrow?: An Investment Approach to Lawmaking Part 2: Private Orderings, Efficiency and the Role of the State 6. The Enforcement of Contracts and the Role of the State 7. Minimal Liberty and the 'Coasean Liberal': Setting Boundaries and Complementarities between the State and the Market 8. Private Orderings and Intellectual Property: What is it the Best Incentive System? 9. Fairness and Welfare: are they Really Competing Values? Part 3: Contractual Incompleteness and the Nature of Endogenous Enforcement 10. Costly Contingent Contracts: A Failure of the Coase Theorem 11. Game-Theoretic Solutions to Endogenous Contractual Incompleteness 12.Customary Contracts 13.Group Relations and Industrial Districts Part 4: Governance Models and Corporate Ethics 14. What is a Corporation?: The Corporate Personality Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance 15. Fiduciary Duties, Models of Firms and Organizational Theories in the Context of Relational Interdependencies 16. Incomplete Contracts and Corporate Ethics: A Game Theoretical Model under Fuzzy Information


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