The distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences¿the idea that some sentences are true or false just in virtue of what they mean¿is a famous focus of philosophical controversy. Gillian Russell reinvigorates the debate with a challenging new defence of the distinction, showing that it is compatible with semantic externalism.

• Preface


• Acknowledgements


• Introduction


• I: The Positive View


• 1: The 'in virtue of' Relation


• 2: Meaning


• 3: Beyond Modality


• A: The Formal System


• II: A Defence


• 4: The Spectre of "Two Dogmas"


• 5: Definitions


• 6: More Arguments Against Analyticity


• III: Work for Epistemologists


• 7: Analytic Justification

Gillian Russell is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Washington University in St Louis.