Just about every philosophical theory of mind or language developed over the past 50 years in the West is systematically inaccurate. Systemic oppression has influenced the processes that theories of mind or language purport to identify; it has also made it so that most middle-to-upper class White men are ignorant of systemic oppression. Consequently, most theories of mind or language are systematically inaccurate because they fail to account for the influences of systemic oppression. Engelhardt solidifies this argument, exemplifies it with two versions of an influential theory, shows how to remedy the inaccurate theories, and considers some consequences of the remedy.

Jeff Engelhardt is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Dickinson College. Their work appears in Philosophers' Imprint, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Hypatia, Philosophical Studies, and Feminist Philosophy Quarterly.

• Chapter 1 De-idealization, Mind, and Language


• 0. Introduction


• 1. De-idealization


• 1.1 De-idealization and Systemic Oppression


• 1.2 Identifying Idealizing Assumptions


• 1.3 De-idealization and Nonideal Theory


• 2. Objections, Replies, and Clarifications


• 2.1 Acceptable Idealizations


• 2.1.1 Simplifications


• 2.1.2 Exemplars


• 2.2 Is Idealization Antithetical to the Proper Goal of the Enterprise?


• 2.3 The Distinction Between Idealized and De-idealized Theories


• 3. Conclusion


• Chapter 2 De-idealizing Objective Type Externalism


• 0. Introduction


• 1. Content Externalism


• 1.1 Natural Kind Externalism


• 1.2 Objective Type Externalism


• 1.3 Revising the Three Phases of Determination and Discovery


• 1.4 Three Explanatory Goals


• 2. Oppression and the Determination of Type Terms


• 2.1 Oppression Systematically Influences the Development of Social Kind Terms


• 2.1.1 Political and Economic Terms


• 2.1.2 Gender Terms


• 2.1.3 Race Terms


• 2.2 Oppression Systematically Influences Research Into Social Kinds


• 2.2.1 "Intelligent"


• 2.2.2 Race and Gender Terms 1: 'Sexual Ambiguity'


• 2.2.3 Race and Gender Terms 2: Sentimentalism


• 2.2.4 Manifest and Operative Concepts, Dubious Researcher


• 2.3 Oppression Systematically Influences Responses to Empirical Research


• 3. The De-idealized Theory Improves Upon Its Predecessor


• 3.1 Ideal and Nonideal Phases


• 3.2 The De-idealized Theory is Superior


• 4. Conclusion


• Chapter 3 De-idealizing Social Externalism


• 0. Introduction


• 1. Social Externalism


• 1.1 Motivating Social Externalism


• 1.2 The Division of Linguistic Labor


• 1.3 Cognitive Value and Conventional Linguistic Meaning; Terms and Concepts


• 1.4 Social Externalism's Explanatory Goals


• 2. Oppression and the Division of Linguistic Labor


• 2.1 Tools


• 2.1.1 S-Rules, G-Rules, and Exercitives


• 2.1.2 Exercitives and Patterns of Semantic Deference


• 2.2 Corrections


• 2.3 Ranks


• 2.4 Enforcement


• 2.4.1 Enforcing Semantic Deference: Legal Terms


• 2.4.2 Enforcing Semantic Deference: Dominant Terms


• 3. The De-idealized Theory Improves Upon Its Predecessor


• 3.1 Ideal and Nonideal Dialectics


• 3.2 The De-idealized Theory is Superior


• 4. Conclusion


• Chapter 4 Applications


• 0. Introduction


• 1. Epistemic Injustice


• 2. Externalism and Conceptual Engineering


• 2.1 Is Externalist Conceptual Engineering Possible?


• 2.2 Engineering Meaning-making Processes


• 2.2.1 Can and Should We Engineer Our Meaning-making Processes? And if so, How?


• 2.2.2 What Would Ideal Meaning-making Processes Be Like?


• 2.2.3 How Should We Determine Who Determines Meanings?


• 3. Conclusion


• Bibliography


• Index