The game-theoretic analysis of rights forms a rapidly growing field of study to which this book makes an important contribution. Van Hees combines the game-theoretic approach with the results and tools from logic, in particular from the logic of norms. The resulting synthesis between logic and game theory provides a firm foundation for the game-theoretic approach. The analysis shows how different types of right are related to the strategic opportunities of individuals and of groups of individuals. Furthermore, the book makes an important contribution to the theory of liberalism, in particular to the study of the so-called `liberal paradoxes'. It demonstrates how the paradoxes resurface in the new decision-theoretic framework. In fact, they not only do so at the level of `ordinary' decision making, but also at the level of constitutional decision making.

1. The formal analysis of rights. 2. Deontic logic of action: the language. 2*. Formal presentation. 3. Deontic logic of action: Semantics. 3*. Formal presentation. 4. DLA*: collective agents. 4*. Formal presentation. 5. Effectivity functions and systems of logic. 5*. Formal presentation. 6. Individual and collective rights. 6*. Formal presentation. 7. Liberalism and conventional decision making. 7*. Formal presentation. 8. Liberalism and constitutional decision making. 8*. Formal presentation. 9. Conclusion. Appendix 1. Systems of logic. Appendix 2. Atomic types of right. Bibliography. Index of names. Index of subjects. List of symbols and abbreviations.