In August 1940, the Luftwaffe began an operation to destroy or neutralize RAF Fighter Command, and enable Hitler to invade Britain that autumn. It was a new type of air warfare: the first ever offensive counter-air campaign against an integrated air defence system. Powerful, combat-proven and previously all-conquering, the German air force had the means to win the Battle of Britain. Yet it did not.
This book is an original, rigorous campaign study of the Luftwaffe's Operation Adlerangriff, researched in Germany's World War II archives and using the most accurate data available. Doug Dildy explains the capabilities of both sides, sets the campaign in context, and argues persuasively that it was the Luftwaffe's own mistakes and failures that led to its defeat, and kept alive the Allies' chance to ultimately defeat Nazi Germany.

Douglas C. Dildy is a retired US Air Force colonel who retired with approximately 3,200 hours of fast jet time. As commander of the 32d Fighter Squadron, he enforced the No-Fly-Zone over Iraq, making him an expert on F-15 employment. He is a USAF Academy graduate with a Masters Degree in Political Science and has authored numerous books, including To Defeat the Few for Osprey. He contributes regularly to the modelling magazine Small Air Forces Observer and lives in Albuquerque, New Mexico.

Introduction
Chronology
Attacker's Capabilities
Defender's Capabilities
Campaign Objectives
Order of Battle
The Campaign
Analysis
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index