Decisions, Games and Markets is designed to stimulate new developments in decision theory, game theory and general equilibrium theory, as well as in their applications to economics. The book is divided into three parts - Decision Theory, Game Theory, and the Theory of Markets. Though its orientation is primarily methodological, some articles are more applied. The consistent use of formal analysis and methodological individualism constitutes the unifying theme of the book. Decisions, Games and Markets will be of considerable interest to both students and teachers of microeconomics and game and decision theory.

I Decisions.- 1 "Direct" and "Indirect" Duality for Dominance Relations.- 2 Conditional Preferences, Ellsberg Paradoxes and the Sure Thing Principle.- II Games.- 3 Games with Observable Deviators.- 4 Conjectural Equilibria and Rationalizability in a Game with Incomplete Information.- 5 Lexicographic Rationality Orderings and Iterative Weak Dominance.- III Markets.- 6 At The Roots of Indeterminacy.- 7 The Information Content of Specialist Pricing: A Dynamic Model.- 8 "Laws of Large Numbers" in Continuum Economies.- 9 Decentralization, Mobility Costs and the Soft Budget Constraint.- 10 Equivalence and Duality Between the Sets of Pareto-Maximal Allocations and the Sets of Maximal Distributable Surplus Allocations, Including Externalities.- 11 Economic Models of Social Learning.- 12 Market Size, the Informational Content of Stock Prices and Risk: A Multiasset Model and Some Evidence.- 13 Adoption of Flexible Technologies in an Evolutionary Environment.