Legal and moral reasoning share much methodology, and they address similar problems. This volume charts two shared problems: the relation between theory, principles and particular judgments; and the role of facts and factual assertions in normative settings. Its focus on the role of facts in normative reasoning makes this book of special interest to scholars of legal and moral argumentation.

Contents: Introduction: Theory, Principle, Judgment: General and particular considerations in applied ethics; Guidance by moral rules, guidance by moral precedents; Set a sprat to catch a whale: the structure, strength and function of analogical inferences; The reconstruction of legal analogy-argumentation monological and dialogical approaches. Facts, Judgements, Theories: The role of facts in legal reasoning; Parallels between science and ethics; What is truth?: incest and narrative coherence in law; Empirical science and ethical theory: the case of informed consent; Index.

Albert W. Musschenga, Wim J. van der Steen