The economics of monopsony power results in lower wages and other forms of compensation, as well as reduced employment. Wealth is transferred from workers to their employers. In addition, the employer's output is reduced, which leads to increased prices for consumers. Monopsony in Labor Markets demonstrates that elements of monopsony are pervasive and explores the available antitrust policy options. It presents the economic and empirical foundations for antitrust concerns and sets out the relevant antitrust policy. Building on this foundation, it examines collusion on compensation, collusive no-poaching agreements, and the inclusion of non-compete agreements in employment contracts. It also addresses the influence of labor unions, labor's antitrust exemption, which permits the exercise of countervailing power, and the consequences of mergers to monopsony. Offering a thorough explanation of antitrust policy, this book identifies the basic economic problems with monopsony in labor markets and explains the remedies currently available.

Brianna L. Alderman is a Theodore H. Ashford Fellow at Harvard University. She is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Economics at Harvard University and currently holds bachelor's degrees in Economics, Mathematics, and Statistics from the University of Florida. Her current field interests include industrial organization, labor economics, and antitrust economics.

1. Introduction; 2. The Economics of Monopsony; 3. Empirical Evidence of Monopsony in Labor Markets; 4. Antitrust Policy; 5. The Intended and Unintended Victims of Monopsony; 6. Collusion on Wages and Terms of Employment; 7. No Poaching Agreements; 8. Non-Compete Agreements; 9. Unions and Collective Bargaining; 10. Monopsony and Merger Policy; 11. Closing Thoughts.