Bridging phenomenology, philosophy of mind, and epistemology, Peter Antich asserts that the latter has long been hampered by an inadequate phenomenology of knowledge. However, a careful description of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenon of motivation can offer compelling new ways to think about knowledge and longstanding epistemological questions.

List of Illustrations xi
Acknowledgments
Abbreviations
Introduction
Part I. Defining the Account
1 Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Motivation
2 The Primacy of Perception
Part II. Defending the Account
3 Empirical Judgments
4 Universal and A Priori Judgments
5 Perceptual Faith
Part III. Motivation and Pure Reason
6 Transcendental Justification
7 Metaphysical Judgments and Self-Consciousness
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Peter Antich is visiting assistant professor of philosophy at Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut. His publications include "Merleau-Ponty on Hallucination and Perceptual Faith," in Études Phénoménologiques - Phenomenological Studies, "Perceptual Experience in Kant and Merleau-Ponty," in the Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, and "Merleau-Ponty's Theory of Concept Formation," in the History of Philosophy Quarterly.