In this important new work, scholar, teacher, and diplomat James E. Goodby analyzes how American presidents have confronted the dilemma of nuclear weapons. Drawing on his own involvement in over fifty years of nuclear policy, he explores specific case studies to illustrate the decision making process and the delicate balance between international cooperation and freedom of action, between the rules of behavior and governmental autonomy.

Part 1 Preface Part 2 Part 1: The Logic of War, 1941-1952 Chapter 3 At the Beginning: Churchill, Roosevelt and Truman Part 4 Part 2: Setting the Rules for the Long Haul, 1953-1968 Chapter 5 Nuclear Deterrence or Preventive War? Eisenhower's Choice Chapter 6 John Kennedy: From Crisis to Triumph to Tragedy Chapter 7 Lyndon Johnson: The Offense-Defense Riddle Part 8 Part III: Facing the Problems of Parity, 1969-1980 Chapter 9 Richard Nixon: Only Connect Chapter 10 Gerald Ford: A Time to Plant Chapter 11 Jimmy Carter: The Limits of Presidential Power Part 12 Part IV: A Break With the Past, 1981-1988 Chapter 13 The Reagan Revolution in Nuclear Weaponry Part 14 Part V: Once More into the Unknown Chapter 15 George H. W. Bush: Managing the Soviet Succession Chapter 16 William J. Clinton: Facing New Threats Chapter 17 George W. Bush: Overthrowing the Old Order Part 18 Afterword