Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory.

Robert Powell has had a long career in social and market research. Robert spent many years in Canada before returning to Australia, and served as a national director for a number of international corporations prior to commencing his own market research business in 1990.In his professional career, Robert developed a particular interest in the impact of change on individuals, during the transitions between life stages and sought to provide a greater understanding of the sensitivities involved in what for many is a traumatic event.

Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. The nuclear revolution and the problem of credibility; 3. The dynamics of nuclear brinkmanship; 4. Stability and longer brinkmanship crises; 5. Crisis stability in the nuclear age; 6. Stability and the lack of control; 7. The strategy of limited retaliation; 8. An appraisal; Appendix: some introductory notes on game theory; References; Index.