The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual's success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of game theory since the 1950s. Developing the theories at the heart of game theory has resulted in 8 Nobel Prizes and insights that researchers in many fields continue to develop. In Volume 4, top scholars synthesize and analyze mainstream scholarship on games and economic behavior, providing an updated account of developments in game theory since the 2002 publication of Volume 3, which only covers work through the mid-1990s.

1. Rationality. Ken Binmore
2. Advances in in Zero-Sum Dynamic Games. Rida Laraki and Sylvain Sorin
3. Games on Networks. Matthew O. Jackson and Yves Zenou
4. Reputations in Games. George Mailath and Larry Samuelson
5. Coalition Formation. Debraj Ray and Rajiv Vohra
6. Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics. Peyton Young and Chris Wallace
7. Auctions: Advances in Theory and Applications. Todd Kaplan and Shmuel Zamir
8. Combinatorial Auctions. Rakesh V. Vohra
9. Algorithmic Mechanism Design. Noam Nisan
10. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments and Modeling. Colin F. Camerer and Teck H. Ho
11. Evolutionary Game theory in Biology. Peter Hammerstein and Olf Leimar
12. Epistemic Game Theory. Eddie Dekel and Marciano Siniscalchi
13. Population games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics. William H. Sandholm
14. The Complexity of Computing Equilibria. Christos Papadimitrius
15. Theory of Combinatorial Games. Aviezri S. Fraenkel, Robert A. Hearn and Aron N. Siegel
16. Game Theory and Distributed Control. Jason R. Marden and Jeff S. Shamma
17. Ambiguity and Non-Expected Utility. Edi Karni, Fabio Maccheroni and Massimo Marinacci
18. Calibration and Expert Testing. Wojciech Olszewsk