Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.

• Introduction


• 1: Sharon Street: Mind-Independence Without the Mystery: Why Quasi-Realists Can't Have It Both Ways


• 2: Allan Gibbard: How Much Realism? Evolved Thinkers and Normative Concepts


• 3: David Sobel: Parfit's Case against Subjectivism


• 4: Chris Heathwood: Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure and Welfare


• 5: Sarah McGrath: Moral Knowledge and Experience


• 6: Matt Bedke: Passing the Deontic Buck


• 7: Richard Joyce: The Accidental Error Theorist


• 8: Jonas Olson: Getting Real about Moral Fictionalism


• 9: Campbell Brown: A New and Improved Supervenience Argument for Ethical Descriptivism


• 10: Paul Katsafanas: Activity and Passivity in Reflective Agency


• 11: Julia Markovits: Why be An Internalist about Reasons?


• 12: Ralph Wedgwood: Instrumental Rationality


• Index

Russ Shafer-Landau is professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is the author of Moral Realism: A Defence (OUP 2003), which received an honourable mention for the 2005 APA Book Prize, and Whatever Happened to Good and Evil? (OUP 2004).