Roger D. Blair is Walter J. Matherly Professor, Department of Economics at the University of Florida where he has taught for 40 years. His research interests center on antitrust economics and policy. In addition to numerous articles in economics journals and law reviews, he has published Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control, Antitrust Economics, Monopsony in Law and Economics, and Antitrust Law, Volume II with Areeda and Hovenkamp. Dr. Blair has also served as an expert witness in over 50 cases.
D. Daniel Sokol is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Florida Levin College of Law. He is co-editor of the Global Competition Law and Economics book series (Stanford University Press) and of the Oxford Handbook of Antitrust Compliance (Oxford University Press, forthcoming). He also is editor of the Antitrust and Competition Policy Blog. Professor Sokol has provided technical assistance and capacity building to antitrust agencies and utilities regulators from around the world.

I. MONOPOLIZATION: CONDUCT
1. A Framework for the Economic Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct
B. Douglas Bernheim and Randal Heeb
2. Predatory Pricing
Kenneth G. Elzinga and David E. Mills
3. Raising Rivals' Costs
David T. Scheffman and Richard S. Higgins
4. Predatory Buying
John E. Lopatka
5. Competitive Discounts and Antitrust Policy
Kevin M. Murphy, Edward A. Snyder, and Robert H. Topel
6. Squeezing Claims: Refusals to Deal, Essentials Facilities, and Price Squeezes
Barak Orbach and Raphael Avraham
7. Innovation and Antitrust Policy
Thomas F. Cotter
8. Continental Drift in the Treatment of Dominant Firms: Article 102 TFEU in Contrast to § 2 Sherman Act
Pierre Larouche and Maarten Pieter Schinkel
9. Treatments of Monopolization in Japan and China
Ping Lin and Hiroshi Ohashi
10. Monopolization in Developing Countries
Alberto Heimler and Kirtikumar Mehta
11. Business Strategy and Antitrust Policy
Michael J. Mazzeo and Ryan C. McDevitt
II. VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTRACTUAL EQUIVALENTS
12. Resale Price Maintenance of Online Retailing
Benjamin Klein
13. Exclusive Dealing
Howard Marvel
14. Tying Arrangements
Erik Hovenkamp and Herbert Hovenkamp
15. Vertical Restraints Across Jurisdictions
Ralph A. Winter and Edward M. Iacobucci
16. Franchising and Exclusive Distribution: Adaptation and Antitrust
Francine Lafontaine and Margaret E. Slade
III. COLLUSION AMONG OSTENSIBLE COMPETITORS
17. Cartels and Collusion: Economic Theory and Experimental Economics
Jay Pil Choi and Heiko Gerlach
18. Cartels and Collusion: Empirical Evidence
Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow
19. Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly
Edward J. Green, Robert C. Marshall, and Leslie M. Marx
20. Auctions and Bid Rigging
Ken Hendricks, R. Preston McAfee, and Michael A. Williams
21. Screening for Collusion as a Problem of Inference
Michael J. Doane, Luke M. Froeb, David S. Sibley, and Brijesh P. Pinto
22. Competition Policy for Industry Standards
Richard Gilbert
23. Antitrust Corporate Governance and Compliance
Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz and D. Daniel Sokol

More than any other area of regulation, antitrust economics shapes law and policy in the United States, the Americas, Europe, and Asia. In a number of different areas of antitrust, advances in theory and empirical work have caused a fundamental reevaluation and shift of some of the assumptions behind antitrust policy. This reevaluation has profound implications for the future of the field.
The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics has collected chapters from many of the leading figures in antitrust. In doing so, this two volume Handbook provides an important reference guide for scholars, teachers, and practitioners. However, it is more than a merely reference guide. Rather, it has a number of different goals. First, it takes stock of the current state of scholarship across a number of different antitrust topics. In doing so, it relies primarily upon the economics scholarship. In some situations, though, there is also coverage of legal scholarship, case law developments, and legal policies.
The second goal of the Handbook is to provide some ideas about future directions of antitrust scholarship and policy. Antitrust economics has evolved over the last 60 years. It has both shaped policy and been shaped by policy. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics will serve as a policy and research guide of next steps to consider when shaping the future of the field of antitrust.