Moral philosophy has long been dominated by the aim of understanding morality and the virtues in terms of principles. However, the underlying assumption that this is the best approach has received almost no defence, and has been attacked by particularists, who argue that the traditional link between morality and principles is little more than an unwarranted prejudice. In Principled Ethics, Michael Ridge and Sean McKeever meet the particularist challenge head-on, and defend a distinctive view they call "generalism as a regulative ideal."

• 1: The many moral particularisms


• 2: Holism about reasons


• 3: Default reasons


• 4: Moral vision


• 5: Constitutive generalism


• 6: From moral knowledge to default principles


• 7: Beyond default principles or trimming the hedges


• 8: Generalism as a regulative ideal


• 9: Principled guidance


• Appendix