Jonathan L. Kvanvig presents a new account of rationality, Perspectivalism, which both avoids elevating rationality so that only the most reflective of us are capable of rational beliefs, and avoids reducing it to the level of beasts. He defends optionality about what it is reasonable to think, and provides a framework for rational disagreement.

Jonathan L. Kvanvig is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at Baylor University, having held previous faculty positions at the University of Notre Dame, Texas A&M University, and the University of Missouri. His scholarly activities focus in metaphysics & epistemology and philosophy of religion, including related topics in philosophy of language and philosophy of logic, with thirteen books and over one hundred articles published. He is the editor of the prestigious Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion. He has received grants from the NEH and the Templeton Foundation for scholarly activities, and is the recipient of distinguished research awards from Texas A&M and Baylor.

• Introduction


• 1: Epistemic Appraisal


• 2: The Egocentric Predicament and Normativity


• 3: Excusability


• 4: Rational Disagreement


• 5: Perspectivalism and Optionalism


• 6: From Schema to Theory: The Role of Autonomy in the Theory of Rationality


• 7: Conclusion


• A: Reducing Personal to Doxastic Justification


• B: Reducing Doxastic to Propositional Justification


• Index


• Bibliography