Kenneth R. Westphal presents an original interpretation of Hume's and Kant's moral philosophies. He argues that focusing on the differences between these two accounts occludes a decisive, shared achievement: a constructivist account of the basic principles of justice which does not depend on moral realism nor moral anti-realism or irrealism.

Kenneth R. Westphal is Professor of Philosophy at Bogaziçi Üniversitesi, Istanbul. His research concerns the character and scope of rational justification in non-formal, substantive domains, including both theoretical philosophy (epistemology, history, and philosophy of science) and moral philosophy (ethics, social, political. and legal philosophy). This, his fifth monograph, is his first published by the Clarendon Press; others are issued by Cambridge University Press, Vittorio Klostermann, and Hackett Publishing Co. He has edited four collections of research and published nearly 150 research articles, in such journals as Synthese, Dialogue, Journal of the History of Philosophy, Philosophical Inquiries, Journal for the History of Analytic Philosophy, HOPOS, and Jurisprudence. His article, 'Kant on the State, Law, and Obedience to Authority in the Alleged 'Anti-Revolutionary' Writings' (1992, rpt. 2006) received the 1994 George Armstrong Kelly Prize.

• Acknowledgements


• Primary Sources and Citation Methods


• 1: Reconstructing Moral Constructivism


• 2: Objectivity, the Euthyphro Question, and Reconstructing Natural Law


• 3: Hume's Construction of Justice


• 4: Hume's Proof of the Insufficiency of Moral Sentiments


• 5: Kant's Moral Constructivism


• 6: Natural Law Constructivism and Rational Justification


• 7: Constructivism, Contractarianism, and Basic Obligations


• 8: Kant's Justification of Rights to Possession


• 9: Conclusion: Reintegrating Justice into Morals


• Appendix


• Bibliography


• Name Index


• Subject Index