Through a comparative analysis of the United States, Canada, Belgium, and the EU, this book examines the constitutional framework in which foreign relations are conducted in federal unions. In doing so, this book contributes to debates on how the EU's foreign affairs constitution should be structured.

Thomas Verellen is Assistant Professor of EU and International Law at Utrecht University and a member of the Utrecht Centre for Regulation and Enforcement in Europe. Following his studies in law and global politics at KU Leuven and the London School of Economics, Thomas obtained his PhD in Law at KU Leuven. His research focuses on the constitutional law of foreign relations in federal unions, particularly the European Union.

• 1: Introduction


• Part I: Self-Rule


• 2: Power Allocation in the US., Canada, and Belgium


• 3: Power Allocations in the EU


• 4: Conflict Resolution in the U.S., Canada, and Belgium


• 5: Conflict Resolution in the EU


• Part II: Shared Rule


• 6: The Political Safeguards of Foreign Relations Federalism in the U.S., Canada, and Belgium


• 7: The Political Safeguards of EU Foreign Relations Federalism


• 8: Intergovernmental Relations in the U.S., Canada, and Belgium


• 9: Intergovernmental Relations in EU Foreign Policy Making


• 10: General Conclusion