Stephen P. Garvey is the A. Robert Noll Professor of Law at Cornell Law School. His scholarly work addresses doctrinal and theoretical questions arising from the substantive criminal law. He is co-author of Criminal Law: Cases and Materials, now in its eighth edition.

• Introduction


• Chapter 1 - Authority


• I. Anarchism - Rex's Dilemma


• A. Criminalization


• B. Culpability


• C. Punishment


• II. Statism - Leviathan's Peace


• A. Social Peace


• B. Political Peace


• III. Democratic Authority


• A. A State's Right to Conformity


• B. A Democratic State's Authority


• IV. Rights


• A. Criminalization


• B. Punishment


• C. Culpability


• Chapter 2 - Rights


• I. Actus Reus


• A. The Conventional Theory


• B. The Rights Theory


• II. Mens Rea


• A. The Conventional Theory


• B. The Rights Theory


• Chapter 3 - Knowledge


• I. Actus Reus


• A. The Capacity to Choose Otherwise


• B. The Stephen Test


• C. Insanity


• Ii. Mens Rea


• A. Duress Two Ways


• B. Provocation


• C. The Willing Addict


• III. Tracing


• Chapter 4 - Ignorance


• I. Ignorantia Juris


• A. The Maxim's Scope


• B. Defending the Maxim


• C. "Ignorance" of "Law" Defined


• II. Actus Reus


• A. The Lex Test


• B. Insanity


• III. Mens Rea


• A. The Jekyll Test


• B. Putting Jekyll to Work


• IV. Tracing


• Chapter 5 - Agency


• I. Tradition


• II. Irrationality


• A. Unintelligibility


• B. Delusion


• III. Lost Agency


• A. The Demon Within


• B. Defects of Consciousness


• IV. Authority


• Chapter 6 - Injustice


• I. Revolution


• A. The Revolutionary Road


• B. After the Revolution


• C. Resistance


• II. Reform


• A. Culpability


• B. Standing


• III. Authority


• A. The State of Exclusion


• B. Core Crimes


• C. Non-Core Crimes


• Conclusion.

Guilty Acts, Guilty Minds proposes an understanding of actus reus and mens rea (the guilty act and guilty mind) as limits on the authority of a democratic state to ascribe guilt. Going beyond discussions of legal justice, Stephen Garvey argues for actus reus and mens rea as necessary conditions, among others, for the legitimacy of state punishment.