The essays in this volume open up reflection on the implications of social inequality for theorizing about moral responsibility. Collectively, they focus attention on the relevance of the social context, and of structural and epistemic injustice, stereotyping and implicit bias, for critically analyzing our moral responsibility practices.

• Contributors List


• Introduction: Moral Responsibility in Contexts of Structural Injustice Katrina Hutchison, Catriona Mackenzie, and Marina Oshana


• 1. Power, Social Inequities, and the Conversational Theory of Moral Responsibility Michael McKenna


• 2. Moral Responsibility and the Social Dynamics of Power and Oppression Catriona Mackenzie


• 3. Ascriptions of Responsibility Given Commonplace Relations of Power Marina Oshana


• 4. The Social Constitution of Agency and Responsibility: Oppression, Politics, and Moral Ecology Manuel R. Vargas


• 5. Two Ways of Socializing Moral Responsibility: Circumstantialism vs. Scaffolded Responsiveness Jules Holroyd


• 6. Respecting Each Other and Taking Responsibility for our Biases Elinor Mason


• 7. Socializing Responsibility Neil Levy


• 8. Moral Responsibility, Respect and Social Identity Katrina Hutchison


• 9. Answerability: A Condition of Autonomy or Moral Responsibility (or Both)? Natalie Stoljar


• 10. Answerability Without Blame? Andrea C. Westlund


• 11. Personal Relationships and Blame: Scanlon and the Reactive Attitudes Bennett W. Helm


• 12. Sharing Responsibility: The Importance of Tokens of Appraisals to our Moral Practices Maureen Sie

Katrina Hutchison is a research fellow in philosophy at Macquarie University, Sydney. She works mainly in bioethics and moral psychology. Her research draws on feminist scholarship and is unified by concern for those who lack social power.
Catriona Mackenzie is Professor of Philosophy and Associate Dean in the Faculty of Arts at Macquarie University, Sydney. She has published extensively in moral psychology, feminist philosophy and applied ethics. Within these areas she is known especially for her work on relational autonomy and practical identity.
Marina Oshana is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Davis. Her research reflects her evolving interest in the nature of personal autonomy and the conditions for autonomous agency, the meaning of moral responsibility and the conditions for responsible agency, and the nature of the self and of self-identity. She has published widely in these areas, as well as in feminist analyses of responsibility and in philosophy of law.